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strategy, operations, and the margin of victory

Dov S. Zakheim

Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of
Modern War, by Douglas Macgregor. Foreword by Robert
M. Citrino. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 288
pages. $34.95.

Douglas Macgregor, a decorated Army tank commander who has gone on to become a leading iconoclastic—and prescient—military intellectual, has produced
an ambitious evaluation of five key twentieth-century battles and the strategic
and operational assumptions that led up to them. Margin of Victory examines in
great yet readable detail the strategic 1914 battle of Mons and the strategic withdrawal that followed it; the 1937 Japanese battle for Shanghai; the 1944 Soviet
destruction of the Wehrmacht’s Army Group Center in and around the Belorussian swamps; the Israeli counterattack across the Suez in the 1973 Yom Kippur
War; and the crushing American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1991
battle of 73 Easting. Taken together, Macgregor argues, these battles have much to
offer those who formulate contemporary American strategy and plan its military
operations. Indeed, he goes further: those who ignore the lessons of these battles
do so at their peril. As he states in his introductory paragraph, “Hell . . . can be
defined in three words: defeat in war. Margin of Victory is about avoiding hell.”
Macgregor devotes a chapter to each of the five major battles he has chosen as
object lessons for current civilian and military policy makers. His account of the
battle of Mons is actually a panegyric to Richard Haldane, Britain’s secretary of state
for war from 1905 to 1912. Facing unstinting opposition from a hidebound officer
corps wedded to operational concepts that had failed miserably in the Boer War
and confronting budget constraints that prioritized the modernization of the Royal
Navy, Haldane nevertheless managed to create a general staff, transform the army
into a capable expeditionary force, organize a trained reserve, emphasize realistic
training, and inaugurate a regimen of professional military education. His reforms,
Macgregor states, would be called today “disruptive innovation.” As a result, the
seriously outnumbered British Expeditionary Force was able both to force the invading German forces to alter their plans for the atDov S. Zakheim was Under Secretary of Defense
tack on Paris and to slow them sufficiently to enable
(Comptroller) from 2001 to 2004 and Deputy Under
the Allies to mount the defenses that stopped the
Secretary of Defense (Planning and Resources) from
1985 to 1987.
attackers at the battle of the Marne, thereby preventing an attack on the French capital. As Macgregor
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concludes, “by the standards of the early twentieth
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century, Haldane’s reforms achieved miracles.” They also prevented what otherwise might have been a quick German victory in what became known as World
War I.
Macgregor’s account of the battle of Shanghai is essentially a discussion of
what happens when a modernizer’s efforts are ignored or overridden. General
Kazushige Ugaki, Japanese minister of war from 1924 to 1927 and 1929 to 1931,
identified the Soviet Union as Japan’s primary potential adversary and recognized
that, as Macgregor puts it, “in the future the IJA [Imperial Japanese Army] would
need the mobility and firepower to conduct sweeping flank attacks, enveloping
or encircling the Russian enemy.”
Ugaki also challenged the prevailing Japanese view that budgetary priority
should be assigned to naval force modernization and expansion. Few of his reforms to realize his objectives outlasted his terms in office, however. As a result,
Japan conducted a bloody and far too costly campaign to seize Shanghai from
Chiang Kai-shek’s more numerous but vastly outgunned and poorly trained
troops, only succeeding thanks to firepower support from Japanese naval and
air forces. Japan then successfully conquered eastern and southern China, but,
as Macgregor points out, “Japan’s war with China not only delayed and disrupted
the IJA’s modernization; it also fatally crippled Japan’s northern strategy to defeat
the Soviet Union, while putting Japan on a collision course with Britain and the
United States. Thus, where Haldane succeeded, at least in part, to the benefit of
his country’s forces, Ugaki failed completely, to the costly detriment of Imperial
Japan.”
Ugaki’s failures pale by comparison with the mad strategy that propelled Hitler
into invading the Soviet Union and then refusing to implement a planned withdrawal that could have saved huge numbers of his troops. It was true that during
the 1930s the Germans had increased their tactical fighting power by focusing on
attacks at the point of impact. Nevertheless, the Soviet military, recovering from
Stalin’s purges, centrally driven from the top, with unity of command, and indifferent to massive personnel losses, successfully focused on “integrating and concentrating combat power on the operational level for strategic effect.” The results
of Hitler’s mistakes and the Soviet transformation played out in 1944, when the
Red Army was able to destroy the German Army Group Center. Until it was clear
all was about to be lost, Hitler vehemently opposed any withdrawal in the face
of the advancing Soviet troops, insisting that his soldiers “fight to the last man.”
His generals, many of whom were nonprofessional party hacks, were unable or
unwilling to challenge his decision. Even when he finally consented to an organized withdrawal to more-defensible positions, Hitler insisted that forces remain
behind to defend the various towns from which they had operated. As a result,
the Soviets were able to bypass what Hitler termed “fortified places,” encircle and
destroy the retreating army group, and take the towns as well. In Macgregor’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/13
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words, the Soviet transformation, encompassing changes in “command structure,
organization for combat, and supporting doctrine for the application of military
power in the form of strike—artillery, rockets, and airpower—with operationally
agile maneuver forces created a margin of victory that changed the course of
European and world history.”
Macgregor’s fourth case study, that of the Israeli counterattack across the
Suez Canal, is meant to demonstrate how a culture that fosters flexibility and
independent initiative and leadership enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
to offset intelligence misreadings of Egyptian preparations to cross the canal. He
also points to Israel’s merit-based promotion system and the IDF’s recognition
that “one size does not fit all”—in other words, its diversity of capacity. Macgregor
allows that Ariel Sharon went beyond mere initiative and flagrantly disobeyed
orders. But Macgregor also notes that Sharon’s admittedly costly efforts to surprise, and contribute to the encirclement of, Egypt’s Third Army were a major
factor in the success of the Israeli counterattack. Macgregor credits Anwar Sadat
with the foresight to recognize that only by redeeming Egypt’s honor, which had
been crushed in the Six-Day War, could Cairo finally achieve peace with Israel,
one that has stood the test of the region’s endless crises and wars for the better
part of four decades.
Macgregor led a tank battalion in the battle of 73 Easting, a major American
triumph in the 1991 war with Saddam Hussein and another source of lessons for
achieving a “margin of victory.” Macgregor has written about this battle before: in
2009 he devoted an entire volume, entitled Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle
of 73 Easting, to the events of 26–27 February 1991. The book offers an account of
the actions of the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (“Cougar
Squadron”), which surprised and crushed an Iraqi Republican Guard armored
brigade by charging out of a sandstorm during Operation DESERT STORM in what
became the U.S. Army’s largest tank battle since World War II. Macgregor’s purpose in repeating the tale is to argue that President George H. W. Bush ordered a
cease-fire prematurely, while Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded Operation
DESERT STORM, essentially let fifty thousand Republican Guards escape virtually
unscathed, only to be rearmed by Saddam to fight another day. Macgregor is
also bitterly critical of the American military’s failure truly to integrate its forces,
so that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines continue to seek service selfsufficiency, at a cost to overall operational effectiveness.
Macgregor’s description of each of the foregoing battles is gripping and fast
paced. It is unfortunate that the maps that accompany his prose often do not
include the towns, and at times the rivers, to which he refers, so the reader loses
track of the tactical ebb and flow of battle. Macgregor’s editors also should have
ensured a consistent approach to the spelling of towns and other locales whose
names are central to the battles. For example, at times the book simply misspells
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names, as in Chongming Island (which Macgregor spells Changming). Macgregor
also is not consistent in his use of romanized forms of the place-names he cites:
Chinese place-names employ pinyin, the system introduced by the Communists
in 1949, although he is writing about battles that took place when the Wade-Giles
system was still in use. On the other hand, he mentions Cheju-do Island, spelled
as it was in 1937; the current Korean spelling is Jejudo.
One might quibble with other elements of Macgregor’s history. He writes of
Field Marshal French’s argument with Lord Kitchener in Paris without explaining when French got there, since French last had been mentioned in the context
of the battle of Le Cateau. At one point Macgregor erroneously calls Shanghai
the capital of Nationalist China. He does not mention that Germany was able
to provision the Wehrmacht with considerable matériel thanks to Jewish, Polish, and other slave labor. Nor does he mention the diversion of resources from
Wehrmacht fighting power owing to Hitler’s mad preoccupation with the extermination of Jews, even as the fortunes of war turned against his forces. And
Macgregor does not note that the fact that Sadat ordered his forces to cross the
canal on Yom Kippur, when Israelis were preoccupied with the holiest day on
their religious calendar, certainly contributed to the Egyptians achieving strategic
and operational surprise.
All told, however, Macgregor has written another powerful critique of the
American way of planning and developing strategy for war. His lesson for
policy makers and strategists alike is that “whenever new military concepts and
technologies appear, the complex interaction of national culture, bureaucratic
interests, and economic power does not automatically work to support them. . . .
[W]hen conditions change and the margin of victory suddenly narrows, frailties
and vulnerabilities concealed from view inside the armed forces . . . suddenly
produce catastrophic failure.” He asserts that Washington needs to focus on its
long-standing and still primary strategic concern, namely, prevention of a hostile
power from dominating the Eurasian lands. He argues that the American military
must increase its force levels, notably those of the Army. And he advocates for
the creation of what he terms a “national defense staff ” (in other words, a general staff) “to guide the application of American military power,” encompassing
integrated capabilities across service lines.
Not everyone will agree with Macgregor’s prescriptions. Often he has been a
lonely voice in the wilderness. Yet as America transitions to a new administration, it would do well at a minimum to pay close attention to what Macgregor has
to say. Because one thing is certain: America’s next war certainly will not be like
those it is fighting today, and those who make the all-too-frequent error of fighting tomorrow’s war with today’s assumptions and experience surely will regret
doing so, as Macgregor has demonstrated so ably yet again in his latest volume.
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